The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies.
Introduction
The Asian financial crisis that started in 1997, partly originated from the prolonged recession in Japan in the early 1990s (Sachs, 1998) , which adversely affected the performance of many East Asian economies, including Malaysia. It is generally believed that a lack of sound corporate governance was to a certain extent, a major with corporate insiders ac't as if minority investors capital has no opportunity cost. Hence, they do not feel obliged to provide a return to the shareholders.
Recognising the importance of corporate governance and disclosure adequacy, it is vital to have a study focusing on developing a framework and benchmarking corporate governance practiCE's (imong Malaysian companies. I--Ience, this study atl.empts to find out whether good corporate governance practices have a positive relationship with the timeliness of reporting, level of disclosure as well as company's performance. The findings of this study are important to rel:,TUlators, investors, academics and others who contend that good corporate governance is important for increasing investor confidence and market liquidity (Donaldson, 2003) . With the regulations focusing on corporate governance introduced by the Malaysian authorities (as part of their corporate governance reform agenda), such as the Report of Finance Committee on Corporate ('rlwernance, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, there is a widely held view that better corporate govemance is associated with better finn performance. However, the evidence is tenuous (LeBlanc and Gillies, 2003) .
The results of our study of 73 good performance companies and 73 bad performance companies found that corporate governance fac'tors have a strong predicting power on company performance, mainly due to debt monitoring and foreign ownership. However. then~ is a significant negative relation behveen audit quality and pfdonnance. The results fine! that perJom:ance is not associated with the level of disclosure and timely reporting. The results indicate that disclosure and timeliness are not significant contributing factors in the relationship bet\veen corporate governance and market performance.
The remainder of this paper is struc'tured as follows. In the next sec'tion, we review the literature on internal governance, ownership stnlCture and financing factors as \vell as audit quality. The following section provides a discussion on hypothesis development which involves the relationship between corporate govemance and performance, as well as between corporate governance and transparency. The third section e:ll.'"j)lains the methodology used to satisfy the objectives of study. The fourth section reports the results of the study, leading to a conclusion, implications and limitations of the study.
Literature review Internal governance
The board of directors is an important component of internal governance that enables the ~"olving of agency problems inherent in managing any organisations. The board ha.s the pc)\ver to hire, (ire ~md compensate the top-level decision managfrs and to ratify and monitor vital decisions. Board of directors are widely recognised as an important mechanism for monitoring the performance of managers and protec'ting shareholders' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The Malaysian Code on Corporate ('rlwernance (MCCG) (Finance Olmmittee on Corporate Governance, 2(01) also recogni..-;es that good corporate governance rests firmly with the entire board of directors and as such, they should take the lead role in establishing best practice.
With regard to the independence of board of directors, it is argued by both agency theory and resource dependence theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992) that the larger the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board, the better they <:.:1.n fulfil their role in monitoring and controlling the actions of the executive directors (ED), as well as providing a window to the outside world. The premise of agency theory is that NEDs are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of ED due to their opportunistic behaviour Gensen and Meckling, 1976) . Mangel and Singh (1993) opine that NEDs have more opportunity for control and face a complex web of incentives, stemming directly from their responsibilities as directors and augmented by their equity position. Hence, NEDs are considered as the check and balance mechanism in enhancing the board's effectiveness. In addition, those who share a similar opinion include Fama and Jensen (1983) who argue that outside directors might be considered to be "decision experts"; Weisbach (1988) notes that NEDs should be independent and not intimidated by the CEO; able to reduce managerial consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987) and they can act as a positive influence over directors' deliberations and decisions (pearce and Zahra, 1992) .
Empirical evidence on the a §ociation between outside independent directors and finll perfom1ance is mixed. Studies have found that having more outside independent directors on the board improves performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994) , while other studies have not found a link between independent NEDs and improved firm performance (Hennalin and Weisbach, 1991) . The point that can be made from these studies is that there is no dear benefit to firm performance provided by independent I\'EDs. Petra (2005) argues that the mixed results may be reflective of a corporate <.:ulture wherein corporate boards are controlled by management and the presence of independent NEDs has no discernable impact on management decisions.
However, other empirical evidence does suggest that independent NEDs do play the important role of being a shareholder advocate. For example, studies have shown that shareholders benefit more when independent NEDs have control of the board in tender offers for bidders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and in hostile take-over threat."> (Gibbs, 1993) . Furthermore, Beasley (1996) reports that an investigation commissioned by the Tread\vay Commission into the govemance structures of failed fim1s indicates that the boards of diret,lors were dominated by management and "grey" directors (i.e. outsiders with special tie."> to the t,,(lmpany or management). Beasley (1996) found that independent NEDs reduce the likelihood of financial statement fraud. These studies indicate that independent NEDs do monitor and control management and this could lead to better company performance.
Another aspet,l of corporate governance that has become a concern nowadays i." the "dominant personality" phenomenon (Forker, 1992) . The i §ue revolves around role duality, that is, when the CEO is also the Chairman of the board. There are two views in this issue. Firstly, the proponents of agency theory argue for a separation of the two roles to provide essential check and balances over management's performance (Argenti, 1976; Stiles and Taylor, 1993; Blackburn, 1994) . On the other hand, the alternative argument based upon stewardship theory is that the separation of roles is not vital, since many companies are well run with combined role." and have strong boards fully capable of providing adequate checks. In addition, when the role is combined, the CEO may be able to shape the company to achieve stated objet,lives due to less interference. Those who advocate role duality are Ei..<;enhardt (1989), Dahya et a1 (1996) , Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Rechner and Dalton (1991) . The basis of their arguments is stewardship theory, which suggests that managers at,l in the best interests of the finns and shareholders, and that role duality enh.:mces the effectiveness of boards.
As for the as.."ociation between role duality and performance, Abdul Ralunan and Haniffa (2003) documented that Malaysian companies with role duality seem not to perform as well as their counterparts with separate board leadershjp based on accounting performance measurement. Dahya et oJ. (1996) also concluded that the market responds favourably to the separation of the roles and that the accounting per(onnance of firms with role duality appears to decline. In other words, a separation of the role of the Chairman and CEO will help enhance monitoring quality and reduce the advantages gained by withholding information, and therefore the quality and timeliness of reporting will improve. In looking at the Malaysian context, role duality is not particularly common among listed companies although the potential impact on disclosure and timeliness and ultimately the effect on performance is considered worthy of testing (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) .
Another important aspect of corporate governance is about the issue of direl'tors (regardless of executive or non-executive) who may sit on more than one board (cross-directorships). Dahya et aL (1996) suggest that cross-directorships will help in making information more transparent as comparisons can be made based on knowledge of other organisations. Hence, decisions made at one board may become part of the information for decisions at other boards. In adilition, the interlocking of CEOs is desirable because of their experience and credibility as peers. This has been emphasised by Lorsch and Maciver (1989, p. 27 ) who assert that "serving on board is a way to see how somebody else is doing the same thing". In other words, CEOs join other boards and thereby create interlocking relationships specifically to "embed" what they are doing (Davis, 1996) .
High management ownership where managers obtain effective control of thefiml will be negatively related to firm value because of managemen t entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . These authors argue tha t managers entrench them.selves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for sh.:1reholders to repl1.ce them. According to Wright (1996) , the pos.."ible reason is because managers with high levels of stock ownership, the potential for undiversified personal we..1.lth portfolios, and the potential for entrenchment may elicit management decisions inconsistent with a growth-oriented, risk-taking objective of enhancing shareholder value.
Studies invesl:igatil1g the relationsh ip between finn performance anel managerial stock ownership have come up with mixed evidence (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McOll1nell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) . In the USA, studies show that the effect of insider ownership to company performance is dependent upon the percentage of ownership. For example, Morck et aL (1988) find a positive relationship when the ownership is below 5 per cent, but shows a negative relationship when the range of ownership is between 5 and 25 per cent. Hiraki et aL. (2003) also provide evidence in their study on Japanese fim1s that insider O\'inership is positively related to fim1 value and expropriation of finn resources to the detelminant of minority shareholders.
The empirical ambiguity of the relationship is often cited as evidence of a complex role of insider ownership. This is because while it aligns the interests of managers and shareholders and thus enhances performance, it also facilitates managerial entrenchment and adversely affel'ts performance. Himmelberg et al (1999) find no meaningful correlation between marulgerial ownership and performance. However, Khanna et al. (2005) provide evidence that the relationship is not spurious as argued by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and there is strong evidence that insider ownership signiflGI.nt:1y impacts J1nn value.
La Porta et al. (2000) defines corporate governance as a SFt: of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by corporate insiders. The degree of expropriation by insiders depends on the inve.."ltrnent opportunities available and the cost of e>'-lJropriation to the finn. Johnson et al. (2000) and Durnev and Kim (2003) suggest that insiders expropriate more when the market is bad, and take less when the market is good These authors argue that one could addres.'l the agency problem between outsiders and corporate insiders by imposing a higher cost on ex-propriation by using grm-vth opportunities, exiernal financing and concentrated ownership. In short, high insider ownership is normally associated with management entrenchment and expropriation of firm rl'_'>ources.
OwnerslujJ strUl:ture!financ£ng fm:tors
Shareholders can exercise their influence over the govemance of individml corporations both formally, through the proxy system where they can initiate and vote on proposals, and informally, through negotiations with corporate management (Davis and Thompson, 1994) . Researchers consider foreign ownership and debt monitoring as part of cor])orate governance because of the influence that they can exert on company's marulgement Foreign ownership is expected to be one of the ways of technologically upgrading fim1s in developing countries. via clirect irnPOlt of new capital and new tt'chnologies (Benfratello and Sembenell~ 2002; Kozlov et al., 2000) . Another important contribution of foreign investment in transition as well as developing economies is potential spin-offs of western marulgerial techniques (Kozlov et al., 2000) . In addition, foreign-owned films increase competition in the market, thus forcing domestic firms to restructure faster. Restructuring can take the form of technological improvements and improvement in corporate governance, and changes in the range and quality of goods produced.
Kozlov et al (2000) indicate that foreign firms v..-ere fOlmd to be more productive than the domestic ones. A number of studies address the relation between performance and the presence of foreign owners. Makhija and Spiro (2000) examine the share prices of 988 newly privatisecl C7.£ch fimls and f'mel that share prices are positively correlated with foreign ownership. Similarly, Boubakri et ai. (2003) , in a study of 189 sampled finDS in 32 developing countries found that profitability and efficiency gains are associated with the presence of foreign owners. This is also supported by Anderson et al's (1997) study on Czech privatised companies. Similar results are reported by Hingorani et al. (1997) , who conclude that insider and foreign ownership mitigate agency problems through incentives that align the interests of managers and investors.
In Malaysia, there has been no empirical evidence published with respect to the direct impact of foreign ownership and corporate governance practices. However, it is expel1ed that foreign ownership has an indirect impal1 on corporate governance, due to the presence of foreign-owned firms that will increase competition in the market, and therefore exerting pressure on local firms into having good corporate governance at least at par with foreignowned finns. It is hoped thal the presence of foreign ownership as an aspect of governance mechanism would be able to enhance firm performance.
In relation to debt financing, Buslunan et aL(2004) found that board struLlure and high ownership are not independent, and that these governance variables are related to earnings timeline..">s and organizational complexity. Their study shows that limited transparency and complexity of firms' operations are c..'luses of high insider ownership concentration. To overcome the agency costs of high ownership concentration levels, managers and insiders can show their willingness to be monitored by creditors such as banks by increasing their public borrowing (Harvey et ai., 2003; Diamond, 1991) . Harvey et al. (2003) found that in emerging markets where extreme information asymmetry exists between corporate insiders and outsiders, the company uses debt borrowed in international markets to signal their willingness to be monitored by debt holders. However, following the Asian crisis, Malaysia prohibited currency trading and raising debt in developed markets and thus the opportunity to reduce agency costs between insiders and outsiders by this means is also unavailable. Therefore, domestically issued short-term debt will not discourage corporate insiders from using it to further their own entrenched interests, which will only attenuate the agency problems between insiders and outside equity shareholders.
According to SarkaI' and Sarkar (2005) , excess cash flows in a fmn will give opportunities for self-interested managers to take on projeLls with negative NPV and such an "overinvestments" problem reduces the market value of the fim: and impacts shareholder value adversely. Hence, given the high agency costs of insider ownership and the need for capitaL the poor performance L'ompanies would rely on a larger amount of debt financing than the rest.
Audit quality
Audit is an important element of efticient equity markets, because audits can enhance the credibility oj' financial inionnatiol1. directly SUppOlt better C0l1JOrate govemance practices tlu-ough transparent financial repOliing (Francis et al., 2003; Sloan, 2(01) and therefore ultimately influences the allocation of re-sources (SEC, 20(0). Theoretically, a large public accounting finn with greater investment in reputational capital has more reason to minimise audit errors via "auditor-reputation effects" (DeAngelo, 1981; Beatty, 1989) . In addition, Dye (1993) argues that brge auc]jt firms are inclined to supply a higher quality audit compared to small finns, as more wealth is at stake in hrgc audit finns. They will also experience a greater loss through reputation damage if the quality of their audit does not meet the accepted quality standards.
DeFond and jiambalvo's study (1993) indicated that large audit finns are more independent of management. They found that the (then) Big Eight audit finns experienced a greater number of disagreements with former clients than non-Big Eight fim's. Therefore, empirical evidence seems to support the differential audit quality based on the lype of audit fmn. There are a number of empirical studies supporting the positive relationship between audit quality and audit finn size (palrnrose, 19M, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; jang-Yong jonathan and Lin, 1993; Hogan and jeter, 1997) . In addition, as argued by Mitton (2002) , that as quality audit 1.<; also one aspect of corporate govemance, it is expected that 11m,s which are audited by one of Big Four audit 11m,s (a proxy for audit quality) will have a better market perfom,ance as well as greater transparency.
Hypotheses development
Cor/JOral.e governance and /Jer!ormance Corporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will receive adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . If these mechanisms did not exist or did not function properly, outside investors would not lend to Jirn1s or buy their equity securities. Overall, economic perfonnance would likely suffer because many good business opportunities would be missed and temporary financial problems at individual finns would spread quickly to other finns, employees and consumers. Previous evidence suggests that corporate governance has a positive influenc.t' over corporate pe.rformance. For example, based on industry-level view, Rajan and Zinga]es (J998) find that fimls in industries that require large amounts of extemal financing grO\v faster in countries with high scores on their measures of financial development. Thus, corporate governance (measured through better accounting standards, stronger legal protection of investors, and a stronger rule of law) appears to matter for corporate perfonnance. In addition, Liang Li (1999), Williams (2000) , Alves and Mendes (2002) , Drobetz el at. (2003) and Gemmill and Thomas (2004) concluded in their respective studie..-; that there is a positive relationship between gooclc'O!1Jorate governance practices and fiml value.
The above discussion provides a basis to support the argument that there is a positive relationship between good corporate govemance practices and firrr.
performance. This is consistent with the agency theory, where better firn1 perfom1ance is achieved clue to the fact tl1at good governance practices provide better monitoring and better proteLlion to shareholders. The discussion above leads to the hypothesis:
Hi. Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to significant higher tim: perfoffilance.
H2.
Other things being equal, higher foreign o'wnership and higher debt financing lead to significant bjgher finn perfOlTIlanCe_
H3.
Other things being equal, higher audit quality leads to s~gnificant higher firm perfonnance.
Cor/JOral.e governance and lrrms/Jare-ncy
Empirical evidence suggests that improved disclosure has a material impaC1 on the cost of capital. Greater disclosure and timely reporting is said to reduce the cost of equity through lower transaction costs, reduced error in earnings forecasts, or higher demand for a company's securities (Euromoney Institutional Investor, 2001 ).
Another commonly cited benefit of greater corporate disclosure is that by mitigating information asymmetry, it reduces the magnitude of periodic surprises about a finn's perlorn1ance and makes its stock price less volatile (Lang and Lundholm, 1999) . As SUCh, strengthened corporate governance and reporting pral1ices, and the improved tTedibiliiy of financial infonnation thai \vould result, may not eliminate business failure in totality, but could provide the "red flag" signal to the stakeholders especially to the regulators. Hence, in line with past studies, the level of transparency (through better disclosure and timely reporting) is considered a re..-;ult of good governance prac1ice..-; which in turn can help to reduce infonnation asyrrunetry between outsider:;; and corporate insiders, and between institutional shareholder:;; and minority shareholders. This leads to the next hypotheses which state:
H4. Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to significant higher level of corporate transparency.
Hfi. Other things being equal, higher foreign ov-rnership anel h~gher debt financing lead lo signiflcant higher levf1 of c0l1lorale t.ransparency.
H6.
Other thjngs being equal higher audit quality leads to significant higher corporate transparency.
RelationsmjJ between wr/Jorate governance, trans/Jarency and /Jer!onnance
Corporate governance may have an influence on the level of disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2(02) as well as timeliness of reporting, especially as it is the board of directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et aL, 1990) . The quantity of information and especially voluntary items disclosed in the annual reports and the time the infommtion to be released, are influenced by the board of director:;;. Thus, referring back to agency theory, when the board of dim..1:ors are independent of the management and observe their responsibility to be accountable and transparent to the shareholders or stakeholders, they will disclose on time all the relevant information, not just the mandatory ones but also the voluntary items.
In view of the importance of the disclosure factor (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) as well as timely reporting (Oh, 2(03) in relation to corporate governance in Malaysia, this study attempts to test whether corporate governance practices can predict the level of transparency (more specifically the level disclosure and timeliness of reporting). Then, in tum, higher level of transparency may be able to positively affect firm performance based on the premise that improved disclosure as well as timely reporting may reduce cost of capital and mitigate information asymmetry as argued by Euromoney Institutional Investor (2001) and Lang and Lundholm (1999) .
As for the relation between transparency and performance, with increased voluntary disclosure and more timely reporting (therefore greater transparency) Loh (2002) found that finns may gain numerous beneflts, including a better managed company, increased management credibility, more long-term investors, greater analyst following, improved access to C2pital and lower cost of C2pital, and the realisation of a company's true underlying value. Hence, based on this argument, it is expected that flnns with a higher level of disclosure and greater timelinp~'-;S in reporting will gain better market performance. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H7a, Strong corporate governance mechanisms lead to increased transparency.
H7b. InC-Teased transparency leads to significant higher tim: performance.
Research methodology Sam/JIe seJ.ecti(m
The sample covers 868 companies listed on BMB (formerly known as the KL.')E) as at 31 December 2002. Seventy·tive of these companies filel the selection criteria by the KPMG/The Edge ranking of the top 75 listed companies by shareholder value creation (The Edge, 18 August 2(03). However, only the data of 73 of them were u..<:;eable since there is incomplete data for two companies. The 73 companies were used as the benchmark for companies with good performance similar to argumen~ made by Peters and Waterman (1982) and Lee (2003) . The emphasis on shareholder value creation in this study is based on the premise that accounting performance measures are not necessarily consistent with shareholder value performance (Peters and Waterman, 1982) . Therefore, films \vhich shmv good accounting perfonnance do not necessarily create bener value for shareholders.
In order to compare like with like, the same number of control companies as those of the respective companie..<:; set matched by size (total assets) and sec10r on one-tn-one basis were selected from the remaining listed companies. This is similar to the selec1ion method in Abdul Rahman and Limmack's (2005) study on corporate acquisitions of Malaysian listed companies. In order tn selec1 73 companies that will match the good performance group, the total as.<:;et figures (from year 2002 annual reports) for all companies listed on BMB were collected. Then, for each industrial sec10r, the companies were ranked according to their total asset figures. The most (mnpara ble company to the good performance b'TOUP company is identified according to the neaTest total asset figure in each sector. To identify (mupany performance, Tobin's Q is calculated for each film. To take into account the effect of different industries which the companies belong to, industry-adjusted Q is calculated tn represent the rela.tive perfomlaTlce. Out. of the tota 1 146 sample finns, four were eliminated as they were considered as outliers, because the Q value of the two of them were extremely high (above 1(0), while the remainder recorded negative Q. Consequently, the number of usable sample companies was further reduced from 146 to 142.
Data colJ.cr:tilm
The data collected for this study comprises two categories: dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable is represented by Tobin's Q. However, in other regression analysis, transparency (which consist of two components: timeliness of reporting and corporate governance disclosure) is also regressed as a dependent variable. Independent variables consist of seven corporate governance characteristics, viz. board independence, board leadership or role duality, quality of directors, insider ownership, foreign oVvllership, debt financing and audit quality. 
Measurements
In addition to the explanation on the operationalisation given in Table I for each variable, these are the variables that require further explanation:
Economic jmJjit
In Hils study) simi ];-1Y to Lee (2003) , economic profit integrates iJu-ee aspeds of business economics that (rrate shareholder value, namely, nrt operating profit after ta..x (NOPAT), inveo,ied capital OC) and cost of capital. The NOPAT figures used were basically earnings before interest, tax and amortization (EBlTA), less adjusted taxes.
To compute the Ie of a company, an average of its financial year 2001 closing book values of total debt and total equity and its financial year 2002 book values of total debt and total equity was used. The cost of capital is calculated based on its specific weighted average cost of capital, which, in tum, is derived using the weight each company has in terms of its market values of debt and equity. According to the publishers of the business newsletter -The Edge, to calculate weighted average cost of capital in 2002 the risk free rate used was 3.5 per cent, and the average risk premium Table I . Operationalisation of the independent, dependent and control variables sela1:ed and the source of infonnation added to obtain the expected market rate of return was around 4.5 per cent. The key n1f.'lsure by which the companies were ranked in this study was economic profit (or residual income), which is EBITA less weighted average cost of capital of Ie. Lee (2003) emphasized that "EPIIC" is used because it would remove the distortion caused by the difference in company size and could be used to rank companies ba~-ed on economic profit.s.
Audit quality
Even though there are various factors studied that represent audit quality, it seems tb~lt the most commonly studied fartor related to audit qual ity is audit finn si7R. Previous studies document that Big Four (or their precursor:-;) auditor:-; charge higher audit fees, spend more time on audits, and have fewer lawsuits than non·Big Four auditors, implying that Big Four auditor:-; provide higher quality audits than non-Big Four auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmro,se, 1988 Palmro,se, , 1989 . Even after control1ing audit risk, client size and audit complexity, there is an additional premium based on auditor identity (Wooten, 2(03) . Based on the arguments that audit fee can also reflect the level of audit quality (as argued by Shapiro: 1983; Ferguson et al, 2005; Venkataraman et al., 2(05) and that there is a positive association between audit firm size and audit fee, this simiy excludes audit firm size fTom the correlation and regression analysis. Instead, similar to Che Haat et aL's (2005) study on Malaysian PN4 companies [l] , the ratio of audit fee to R.M100 of sales is used, as the data is continuous and is expected to provide more robust results compared to the dununy variable used for audit firm size.
Dz~~closure index
The disclosure index reporting model developed in the current research is based upon fadors identified in national and intem~itional best practice guidelines and other research studies [2] . The model considers objec1ive factor:-; based on publicly disclosed information. Corporate governance factors are generally divided into two main categories: basic corporate governance variables are those items specifically identified by the Code, and quality corporate governance variables are value-added items generally proposed by other best prac1ices worldwide. It is important to note that the ultimate objec1ive of this corporate governance rating exercise is to encourage the firms to uphold the "substance over [am:" princip Ie of govern;mce rather than merely a "box-ticking" process of compliance with statutory regulation. In this study, unlike the self-assessment questionnaire designed by the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2003), and the voluntary disclosure index by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) , and the corporate governance questionnaire used in Saldana's (2000) study (which only provided a dichotomous scale of a "yes" or "no" options), the checklist is designed so that every individual disclosure is evaluated based on a five point of Likert scale. We IDf..Clsured the level of corporate govemance reporting based on the extent to which companies disclose the relevant information in their annual reports. The list classifies the contextual factors into eight major groups that simultaneously emphasize the prac1icability and world-class quality of reporting goals. However, to keep our disclosure index comparable to those used in prior studies, we focused only on the accountability and transparency measures, which include both voluntary and mandatory disclosure requirements that are accounting related (Appendix).
Thnelines.\'
BMB's latest Revamped Listing Requirements (January 2(01), paragraph 9.23, requires listed companies to submit the annual repons within a period not exceeding 6 months from the close of the fiilll.ncial year of the listed issuer. In addition, companies are also required to submit the interim repons, i.e. qua11erly repon not later than two months after the end of each quarter of the financial yc.:'U'.
For the purpose of this study, the date of the submis."ion of the annual repon is the reponing event used. Similar to the operationalisation used by Syed Ahmad and Mohd Zaini (2003) , the annual repon submission date is selected because of the imponant role played by the company's repon as a valuable communication tool to users of the infonnation, and the fal'1: that the release of the annual repons are imponant events as required under the Companies Act (1965) and guidelines issued by the semrity Commission and the KLSE. Thus, timelines." is measured in tenns of the time interval (in number of caJendar days) between the ftscaJ year-end and the elate of announcement of the annual repon submis...,ion made to BMB.
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q is used in this study as a proxy for market rerum. Tobin's Q compares the market value of the tlrm ,vith the replacement cost of the finn's assets. It also implies that the greater the real rerum on investment, the greater the value of Q. The methodology used to calculate Tobin's Q is based on Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Lang et al (1989) and Vogt (1994) -The firm's market value is rrw.asured by the market value of ordinary shares plus the market value of long-tenn bonds and the book value of preference shares. The market value of the ordinary shares is estimated by multiplying the number of ordinary shares by the share price at the end of the fiscal year, while the debt value of alll,lmpanies L.<; equal to the total book value of all long-term debt. The market value of debt could not be obtained because all these companies had obtained private loans, for which information was not available. Similar to Weir et al (2002) , the denominator was measured as net worth which is total assets less total liabilities. The total assets and liabilities were detennined from the annual repons.
Stati~tical {malys1s
All the data were analysed using the statistical package for social science (SPS..S) version 12.0. Based on the above discussion, independent variables comprise the percentage of independent non-exemtive directors (INED) on the board, average number of cross-directorship among INED, role duality, insider ownership, foreign ownership, debt-to-asset ratio and audit quality. The level of disclosure and timely reporting are the variables that repre."ent transparency. The dependen t variable is also represented by Tobin's Q as a measure of market perfonnance. Furthermore, multiple regression models (based on three dependent variables -Tobin's Q, Attribute 5 of a;
Reporting Score (disclosure) and timeliness) are used to determine which of the hypothesised explanatory variables affect the likelihood of a finn in a'eating good performance, and whether corporate governance mechanisms affel'1: the level of disclosure and timeliness of reporting.
Results
The data analysis is to test whether corporate governance mechanisms are significant predic1:ors of market performance, and whether the level of transparency is a signific;mt predictor in the relationship ben.vf-en corporate governance variables and market performance. In brief, Hi to H3 states that corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher market performance, while H4 to H6 state that corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher level of transparency.
Multiple regression was used to test all the hypotheses which are related to corporate governance anributes, disclosure, timeliness and market performance. Several assumptions in regre...,sion analysis have been tested to ensure that there is no significant multicollinearity between the independent variables; that the variance of the distribution of the dependent variable is the same for all value.'> of independent variables (homocedastic1ty); that a linear relationship exists between dependent and independent variables (linearity); that the distribution of values of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable is normal (normality) and that no errors related to measurement and specification exL.<;t Nlulticollillearity was tested based on the correlation matrix. According to Pallant (2001) , multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above). The results of the test: indicate that all thp correlation coefficients between the independent variables are Ie:>.' > than 0.9. An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals against predicted values is conduc1:ed to te."t for homocedastic1ty, linearity and normality assumptions. As recommended by Pallant (2001) , observations with studentised residuals of more than 3.00 are omined from the analysis. Furthermore, normality tests based on skewness, kurtosis and Ko!mogorov-Smimov or K-S. Lilliefors were also conduc1:ed. Transformation is undertaken for both independent and dependent variables when it doe." not meet the assumptions of normality. For example, Tobin's Q, total assets, average number of cross-directorship held by INED, percentage of foreign ownership are transformed into Log while fiml age was transformed into square root The selection of method of transformation is based on the shape of distribution depiC1:ed by histogram, as suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) .
The data were analysed by multiple regression using seven different independent variables (which are grouped into three categories) on 142 companies. The first category is the internal governance factors consisting of four variables namely composition of INED on board, no role duality, quality of directors and insider mvnershjp. The semncl category is ownership structure/financing factors which comprising of foreign QVvnership and debt financing. The third category contains the variable of audit quality that represents an external governance mechanism. The initial sample consisted of 146 companies, however, for the purpose of regression analysis, four companies with extreme Tobin's Q were omitted from the analysis, thus making up 142. Four separate regression models were run, Tables II-V, perfonnance is measmed by Tobin's {J;N = 14Z; "sigl1mcar.t at the 0.10 level; ,,', significant at the 0.05 le\'el; ,,', "signmcant at the O.0llevel signifiGUlt foreign oWTlershjp, debt: -to asset and audit quality (significant at ] 0per cent, 1 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively). All the internal governance mechanisms in the analysis do not have significant influence on firm pedonr~ance. In addition, the significant relation bt:'tween debtto-asst:'t and performance also indicates that market is more confident with the monitoring by finns' creditors. The significant positive relation between foreign ownership and performance is consistent with theory suggesting that foreign investor ownership is positively associated with good perfonnance companies. The results also support the research that shows that the presence of foreign investors in a firm arc associated with higher profitability (Smith et at, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999) as weU as greater efJiciency resulting irorn higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more lucrative products and capital markets (D'Souza et al, 2(01).
Table IT (panel A) also shmvs that there is significant negative relation between aud it fee and fmn pedorrnance, which means that poor perfommncefirrns pay relatively higher audit fees when compared to good perf0I111anCe finns. This suggests that poor performance finns rely on higher audit services to improve their perfonnance. This could be because audit quality is an import;mt factor influencing the business conduct of poorly managed companies which in turn improves their performances. Overall, the significant Fstatistic change in Model 3, Table II governance mechanisms lead to significant higher fim1 perionnance, and higher audit quality leads to significant higher fim1 perfonnance. (panel C) indicate that corporate governance mechanisms do not seem to predic1 higher level of transparency and therefore, there is no support for H4, H5 and H6 which, respectively, state that stronger intemal govemance mechanisms lead to significant higher level of corporate transparency; higher foreign ownership and higher debt financing lead to si.!,1J1iflcant hight'T level of corporate transparency; and, higher audit quality leads to significant higher cOl1Jorate transparency. Furthermore, H7a states that when corporate governance mechanisms are strong, transparency is increased, and in turn, the increased transparency could lead to higher performance as stated by H7b. Table V (panel D) demonstrates the relations between all the corporate governance fac1ofS, disclosure and timeliness regressed against company performance. It was found in the regression for the fourth model that the inclusion of disclosure and timeliness into the regression only contributed marginally to change to R 2. The fourth model also shows that its F-statistic change is not signific..1.nt which mea.ns that the inclusion of disclosure and timeliness does not significantly contribute to better firm peliorn:ance. This mea.ns that there is no support for H7a and H7b either.
Based on the four regressions, the overall results can be summarised in Figure l . The diagram in Figure 1 shows that for Ix)th disclosure and timeliness variables, corporate governance fac10rs do not predict the level of disclosure and timeliness From this analysis, the overall results indicate that practising good corporate governance is an important factor that influences fmn market performance (me.asw-ed by Tobin's Q). This is shown by the adjusted R~! of 0.392 in the t1rst regression model, which indicates that 39.2 per cent of the variation in Malaysian listed companie..<; l' -; explained by the independent variables. The two major contributing factors that significantly influence firnl Inarket perforn131Ke are debt. financing and foreign ownership. However, there is a s~gnificant negative association between audit quality and performance, \villi poor firms using more audit: services than good firms.
Testing the robustness of anlllYS1~' -sjJ/:it dala analysis
In order to test the robustness of the earlier regression analysis, the data is regressed again but at this stage the companie..,-; are split into good and poor performance based on the matched pair basis introduced earlier. The results are shown in Tables VI (panel E) up to IX (panel II). Table ' VI (panel E) Model 2 shows that., consistent with the findings from the earlier regression analysis, the effecl of internal governance mechanisms on both the good and poor perfonnance companies is insignificant. This gives an indica tion that the market does not value internal governance mechanisms implemented within the companies. It might also highlight the way companies respond towards the Code's recommendations, which is possibly more w "box-ticking" rather than taking the "substance" of it. In addition, the neg-ative association of audit quality and performance is stronger to the good performance companies illustrated in Model 3, Table VI (panel E) where the coefficient tor audit quality is -0.080 (significant at 10 per cent level) and -0.082, respectively, and 0.570 and 0.756 (both are signiflcani at 1per cent level), respeclively, for debt-wasset. This implies that good do not consider high quality audit service as an important governance mechanism w anain higher performance, although the companies with relatively poorer performance consider external audits (similar to the findings from Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Che Haat et al, 2(05) and debt financing as an effective tool to bring back their companies to better performance.
Moreover, when disclosure and timeliness are included in the regression against market performance (Table VJ] (panel F)), F-statistic change again does not show a s~gnificant outcome which means that corporate transparency is not the main concern of the market in assessing fim1 perforn1alKe. To examine whether the effect of corporate governance mechanism to disclosure and timeliness is different between the good and poor performance companies, the results in Tables vm (panel G) and IX (panel H) reveal that there is no evidence showing that corporate governance mechanisms have a significant dfed on disclosure and timeliness for both good and poor performance companies. This might indicate that there is ab.'o an "expeclation gap" between the contents of annual reports presented by Malaysian companies and the way the market uses the information found in the annual reports. Perhaps, annual reports are seen to be les..,-; effeclive in conveying useful information to the users or that the users consider other sources of information about the companies as more reliable and trusted. The other pos.."ibility is that investors in Malaysia may not refer to fundamental corporate information as a basis in making their investment decisions, and instead tend to be influenced by speculations in doing w. In other words, the results from the split data regres..<.;ion analysis are consistent with the main analysis mentioned earlier. Apart from supporting the results provided by the main analysis, it also reveals further u....,eful results, for example showing that the effect of corporate governance in forms of high audit quality and monitoring by creditors through debt financing are stronger to the poor perforn,ance companies as compared to good performance companies.
Discussion
In view of the emphasis by the Malaysian government on good corporate governance practices, the role of this study is to explore the fac'tors that cause poor pertormance companies to destroy value instead of creating value for their shareholders. In particular, this study investigates how the corporate governance mechanisms including weak disclosures, poor timeliness of reporting and poor debt management may have raised "red flags" to the stakeholders, bringing about intense scrutiny that could help reduce the agency costs to debt holders and equity holders. In order to make a comparison, using a sample of 73 good performance companies based on shareholder value creation (Lee, 2(03) , and 73 comparable poor performance companies over the year 2002, this stlldy invf'Stigates the governance mechanisms, financing strategies, audit quality, disclosures and timeliness which may determine the good from the poor pertormance companies.
This study anempts to examine the effet.1: of internal governance mechanisms, financing factors/ownership structure and audit quality on disclosure, timeliness and company performance. The estimated equations based on the 142 sample companies strongly indic..'1.te that corporate governance matters for the performance of firms in the market, even though the internal governance mechanisms do not have a strong influence on company periorrnance. The results show that debt-w·asst't and audit quality have a significant influence over the finl1's market performance. This suggests that the external audits serve as an important governance mechanism for creditors, paliicularly to ensure that poor per[onnance finns with high level of debt practise good debt management which ultin1ately helps them improve their financial condition. 'This is similar to the findings made by Mohammed et al (2006) . The signific..'1.nt relation of debt-to-asset to pertormance supports the theory that debt is an important mechanism for solving agency problems in corporations charac'terised by the separation of ownership and control in Malaysia (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995) .
However, when the corporate governance variables are regressed against the level of disclosure and timeliness of reporting, the results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms do not influence disclosure and timeliness of reporting. Moreover, when disclosure and timelines...., are included in the regres....,ion against market performance, the results do not show a significant relationship. This means that transparency is not the main concern of the marl(et in rJ...-;sessing finn pertormance. Therefore, this study does not provide evidence to show the relationship that corporate governance mechanisms lead to greater corporate transparency and there is also no evidence that transparency contributes to better film perfonnance.
Conclusion
The possible reason for "ineffectiveness" of other reported internal governance mechanisms in differentiating the performance of companies is due to the effect of the MCCG. The Code was introduced and became effective in 2001, almost one year before the cut off date of the data used in this study. As a result, this study fails to provide evidence that internal governance mechanisms may contribute to bener company perfonnance because most companies probably has implemented the recommendations of the Code (as suggested by Eow et al., 2003) . Tht'refore, thert' is no significant diHt'rence between good and poor performance companies insofar as internal governance is concerned. This is contrary to tl1t' findings of Leng and J\lansor (2005) and Abdul Rahman and Haniffa (2003) who found that internal governance such as role duality has a positive effect on performance. This could also be because of the difference in the measurement used to represent perfonnance in this study. Unlike their studies which use purely accounting perfonnance (ROE as the variable), this study uses economic profit (represt'nting tht' level of shareholdt'r value creAtion) suggested by Lee (2003) .
In addition, this study introduces variables of disclosure and timeliness in its resp.arch LTamework in order to dt'tennine whether rnarkt't pt'rtonnance is influenced by the level of corporate transparency. Therefore, one of the contributions of this study is to examine whether higher market performance is also due to greater transparency resulting from good governance practice. The insignificant effect of transparency indicates that, in contrary to the theoretical argument by Loh (2002) who suggests that corporate governance may impact transparency and consequently lead to better market perfoilllanCe, this study reveals that tram;parency is not a significant factor that determines the relationship between corporate governance factors and the market perfonnance of a company.
Tht' findings from this study show that tl1t're is no relationship between tht' level of disclosure and market performance, might lead to the question of disclosure framework in Malaysia. The problem with the framework could be due to investors still being unable to have equal access to disclosed infonnation, or that some investors might have had the infonnation earlier than the others. In addition, the contents of the infonnation disclosed might have not catered to the needs of investors. There might also be certain fundamental information that is lacking in the Malaysian disclosure framework. In their criticisms pertaining to this matter, Standard and Poors (2004) revealed that most of the companies in Malaysia still fell short of global disclosure practice (Standard and POOfS, 2004; Toll, 2(04) , and the current study reinforces their point of view. In other words, there is still inadequate disclosure on corporate governance practices which is mandatory under the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, let alone other voluntary infonnation such as business ethics and responsibility, intellectual capital, reviews of vision, mission and goal statements, as mentioned in this study.
In short, corporate governance does matter to Malaysian listed companies, even though monitoring through internal mechanisms seem"> to be relatively ineffective. The contribution of this study is that it shows the importance of good corporate governance mechanisms for debt holders and minority shareholders in emerging markets. Stakeholders can phy a role in reducing agency cost by monitoring "red flags" of weak corporate governance mechanism.." for example, poor debt management and low audit quality.
hnplications of the study
The i~sue of tran~parency (in which di~closure and timely reporting are part of) is with regard to the perception of the stakeholders towards the usefulness of annual reports and other sources of information about companies. The findings from this study show that there is no relationship between corporate governance factors and transparent:y, and there is also no relationship between transparenc...)' and company performance. This might indicate that there is an "expectation gap" between the contents of annual reports pre;ented by Malaysian companies and the way the investors use the information found in the annual reports for their inve;unent decisions. Perhaps, annual reports are seen to be less effective in conveying useful information to the users due to the disclosure of information that is no longer relevant to them, or that current users demand more £rom the contents of annual reports. The Other possibility is that it might be due to the users who consider other source; of information about the companies as more reliable, tmsted and easily accessible relative to the film's annual reporl<;. The fact that investors do not rely on annual reports to make financial decisions may worsen the problem of "information asynunetry", since insiders may take advantage of having access to internal information. Thus, it is important for the regulators such as the SC or BMB to educate the investors, so that they will be able to look at the fundamentals of a company rather than solely rely on speculation in making inve;tment decisions.
This study also highlights foreign O'A-11ership as one of the most signific.."lnt predic...'tors to market perfoffi1ance. This indicate; that foreign investors have an influential role in aJiecling the performance of companies part.iOlhlIly becauSC' of their better skills in selec...'ting good companies to invest in. When compared to local inve;tors, foreign investors seem to be relatively more critical in making business decisions and tend to look at the fundamentals of a company's governance and performance. Therefore, there is a basis for the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia (as quoted in the New Strait, Times on 26 July 2(04) calling local inve;tors to take the lead in investing in the country instead of merely following the foreign institutional funds. The results also support the literature which shows that the presence of foreign inVF-stors in a finn are associated \vith higher protitability (Smith et al., 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999) , forcing local tim:s to restructure especially on corporate governance and technology faster (Yudaeva et aL, 2000) , and higher efficiency resulted from higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more lucrative produc...'ts and capital markets (D'Souza el aL, 2(01) .
With regard to auditing as a corporate governance mechanism, even though lately there has been news that has put auditors under bad light, for example in the case of Enron in the USA, as well as the AWA and lllH failures in Australia (George and Malane, 2(04) , this study indicate; that quality audit can play an important role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in Malaysian companies. Therefore, the regulators, as well as accounting profes.."ional bodie;, should take steps to ensure that audit quality 1..., maintained, and that the independence of extemal auditors is also preserved. This will be reflected in the reliable and credible audit report, which 1.." one of the sources of reference for the users of accounts.
Limitations of the study
The data covers only a one-year period, which is for the year 2002. The purpose of using the 2002 data is in order to observe the effec'ts of the new Revamped KLSE Listing Requirements which were introduced in 2001. The new listing requirements require all listed companies to include in their annual reports a separate statement on corporate governance. Unfortunately, the analysis of corporate disclosure in this study could not be extended beyond the year 2002. This is due to the analysis of annual reports in order to come out with the corporate governance reporting score which was time-consuming, espel'ially in ensuring its reliability and consistency A researcher has to spend between two to four hours to read and identify the information disclosed in each annual report. The results could have been improved if the data were collected from a period of longer than a ye..1.r, for example for a four or five-year period.
The findings of this study are only based on the data. for 2002. Future studies in (his area might want to extend the scope of the data from only a one-year period to a few years, so that one could have a better understanding of the issues of corporate governance especially in an anempt to relate it to certain events, for example the Lastly, this paper deals only with "one-way" causality running from corporate governance mechanisms to performance even though there is evidence of "reverse-way" and "two-way" causality in governance literature.. However, given the high insider ownership levels of insiders it is unlikely that the "reverse-way" causality is present in Malaysia. Notes L PN4 is a classitication pursuant to tile BlVlB's Listing Requirement", whereby listed cmnpanies are required to have an adequate level of tinanci,,j condition in order to warrant conti.nued trading and listing' on the Of1icial List of the Exchange_ Starting .from 1 January 2CK)5, it was replaced by P;-.J17 which extends the criteria of P;-.J4. In this study, P;-.J4 companies are companies which failed to meet the criteria set out under the Bt\-ffi's "Practice ;-.Jote ;-.Jo. 04/2001". They are as follows:
• The company ttiled to reporr the deficit in its combined sl12reholders fnllds.
• Receivers or managers have been appointed to manage the asset of the relevant companyliL<; subsidiaries properties!as.<;ociate companies.
• Auditors have given a "disclaimer opinion" regarding the companies outlook in the company's latest account<;.
• A special manager has been appointed as provided for under the Danaharta ;-.Jasional Berhad Management Act 1998. 
